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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
 Stare decisis is the doctrine whereby judges and courts rely on previous cases to 
support a current decision. This doctrine has been associated with legal reasoning and with 
positive outcomes such as continuity, stability and predictability of the legal system1. In the 
EU, the ECJ does not strictly adhere to this doctrine, unlike common-law systems. However, 
this court seldom depart from its case law, developing “building blocks” which gather a 
coherent corpus of decisions in a continuous line of reasoning. Therefore, it can be said that 
the ECJ operates a rather de facto stare decisis2. This is in light with doctrinal requirements, 
whereby judges should enjoy flexibility to not follow its previous judgments. Otherwise, they 
will be at the risk of stagnating, and so their jurisprudence might be left outdated.  
 However, the principle of legal certainty requires that legal relationships governed by 
EU law remain foreseeable. For this to happen, the ECJ should adhere to its pre-established 
case law, unless there is a reason that excuse departing from it, as well as it should justify 
their judgements rationally. This is particularly important when the ECJ deals with hard 
cases, because they, in order to be solved, require a second-order of justification and 
combination of logos, ethos and pathos arguments, which involve, precisely, reliance on case 
law and coherency with the law.   
 An example of hard cases are the judgments that deal with the concept of economic 
activity. Thereon, the ECJ has developed a “building block” which brought about what I call 
the economic-nature criteria. These are a set of guidelines that aim to “decipher” the essence 
of the concept of economic activity laid down in the second subparagraph of article 9(1) of 
the VAT Directive. In particular, the referred criteria assess whether a transaction is of an 
economic nature. They are of great importance because the economic nature of an activity is 
what determines whether an activity lies or not within the scope of the VAT Directive3.  
                                                          
1 Tridimas, Takis. Precedent and the Court of Justice: A Jurisprudence of Doubt?, n.p.: Oxford University 
Press, Oxford Scholarship Online, (2012), p. 4. 
2 Payandeh, Mehrdad, "Precedents and Case-based Reasoning in the European Court of Justice." International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 12, no. 3 (2014), p. 832. 
3 Case C-369/04 Hutchinson, para 43. 
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 However, in cases regarding the assessment of the concept of economic activity in 
the light of the VAT treatment of public bodies, the ECJ departed from the referred economic-
nature criteria. Although, it is not strictly obliged by its case law, not following its case law, 
without justifying so may jeopardize the very nature of the principle of legal certainty, since 
legal situations may not be foreseeable.  
 Therefore, I analyze in-depth in three judgements in which the ECJ needed to decide 
whether to apply the VAT treatment of public bodies, based on an analysis of the economic 
nature of certain activities, whether the ECJ fulfill with the requirements to enhance legal 
certainty. These cases are Commission v Greece, Hutchinson & T-Mobile and Commission v 
Finland. 
 
1.2. Purpose 
 
 This thesis aims to analyze whether the ECJ has respected the principle of legal 
certainty, when departing from pre-established case law regarding the concept of economic 
activity, in order to assess the application of the special fiscal treatment for public bodies, 
laid down in the VAT Directive. 
 To that end, I first define the doctrine of stare decisis, as well as to describe its role 
in the EU. Next, I discuss whether the ECJ follows this doctrine and, if so, to which extent, 
and why does it matter that the ECJ observe a doctrine of stare decisis. Then, I highlight the 
relationship between ECJ’s case law regarding economic activities and the principle of legal 
certainty. Afterwards, I examine core aspects of this principle, along with its status as a 
principle of EU Law, as well as the channels through which the ECJ should circulate in order 
to enhance legal certainty.  
 Later, I expose the concept of economic activity as presented by the VAT Directive, 
together with relevant ECJ’s case law in which this concept is addressed. Then, I analyze the 
criteria for assessing the economic nature of an economic activity. Next, I present the topic 
of the VAT treatment of public bodies in the VAT Directive. Thereon, I study the criteria 
whereby a state organ should or not be subject to this fiscal situation.  
 Finally, I analyze the cases regarding the VAT treatment of public bodies in which 
the ECJ missed to follow the referred economic-nature criteria. These are Commission v 
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Greece and Hutchinson & T-Mobile. However, I also study a judgment in which the ECJ did 
adhere to its criteria for determining the economic nature of an activity. This is Commission 
v Finland. By this, I attempt to compare the effect, in terms of the principle of legal certainty, 
when the ECJ does and when it does not adhere to its case law. 
 
1.3. Method and Material 
 
 To accomplish the purpose of this work, I pursue a legal dogmatic approach, as 
described by Aarnio, as the study of the content of the legal norms4, which in this case are 
mainly, the articles 9(1) and 13(1) of the VAT Directive, as well as the case law which derives 
from them for the purpose of analyzing stare decisis and the principle of legal certainty. Also, 
I assess whether the decisions of the ECJ, in cases regarding the VAT treatment of public 
bodies, are in light with the principle of legal certainty. In this sense, it will be the principle 
of legal certainty the parameter to judge the “validity”5 of ECJ’s judgements. 
 The material I attempt to use is doctrinal literature regarding stare decisis, the 
principle of legal certainty, the concept of economic activity and VAT treatment of public 
bodies, together with the relevant provisions of the VAT Directive, as well as the ECJ case 
law regarding both the concept of economic activity and the VAT treatment of public bodies. 
 
1.4. Delimitations 
 
 This work centers its attention on the impact on legal certainty when the ECJ departs 
from its previous case law or does not justify the reasons for doing it. To accomplish that 
end, four topics will be discusses: stare decisis, legal certainty, the concept of economic 
activity and the VAT treatment of public bodies.  
 Regarding the former, I focus on the general frame of stare decisis and the 
implications of this doctrine in the ECJ’s case law. Considering the second, I discuss the 
foreseeable and rational justificatory aspects of legal certainty. I not however discuss the non-
                                                          
4 Aarnio, Aulis, The rational as reasonable: a treatise on legal justification. n.p.: Dordrecht: Reidel, cop. 
(1987), p. 12. 
5 Ibid., p. 13. 
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retroactivity of legislation, which forbids “the application of a legislative measure to a 
situation which is fully completed”6. This is because it applies to legislative measures, rather 
than the judiciary procedure. Then, I address the concept of economic activity. Although the 
scope of this term can be applied to a plethora of fiscal situations, such as the right to deduct 
VAT and whether a person is taxable or not, I narrow it to discuss, first, the criteria set by 
the ECJ to determine whether a transaction can be considered of an economic nature. And 
second, its implications in within the VAT treatment of public bodies. Finally, I join these 
two aspects to analyze cases in which the ECJ has solved its judgements considering 
economic-nature criteria and, if not, whether it has diminished the principle of legal certainty. 
 
1.5. Disposition 
 
 This thesis is divided in six sections. The first is the introduction in which I illustrate 
the general frame of this work, together with the objective and method I employ to answer 
whether the ECJ has follow the principle of legal certainty when deciding cases regarding 
the VAT treatment for public bodies, even though it departed from pre-established case law. 
The second is stare decisis. Therein, I expose the generalities of this doctrine, as well as its 
implications in the EU and for the ECJ. The third part is the explanation of the principle of 
legal certainty in its two aspects, the foreseeable and the rational justificatory. The fourth part 
is the description of the concept of economic activity, along with the criteria whereby an 
activity is deemed to be of an economic nature. The fifth part presents the particularities 
regarding the VAT treatment of the public bodies. Finally, the sixth part analyzes two cases 
in which the ECJ departed from its previous case law when discussing the concept of 
economic activity. And also one judgment in which the ECJ adheres to the economic-nature 
criteria. This comparison serves to understand the principle of legal certainty within the 
justification of the ECJ’ decisions in its case law. 
  
                                                          
6 Raitio, Juha. The principle of legal certainty in EC law. n.p.: Dordrecht; London: Kluwer Academic, cop. 
(2010), p. 187-188. 
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2. Stare decisis 
 
 Stare decisis is defined grosso modo as the doctrine of precedents7. This means that 
courts base their judgements in cases already decided, when solving a particular legal issue8. 
Stare decisis is a doctrine mainly followed by common-law systems9. It is argued that this 
feature gives to common-law and alike systems a desired stability, whilst allowing a certain 
degree of flexibility10. And so, following previous rulings11, courts develop a systematic, 
uniform and predictable application of law12.   
 Likewise, stare decisis is considered a technique based on the conception of law as 
experience developed by reason and reason tested and developed by experience13. Following 
this technique, courts find the grounds of decisions in recorded judicial experience14 and 
apply them to like cases, as well as to those, which, however, different in origin, stand, or are 
considered to stand, upon the same principle15. 
 Once a substantial and coherent corpus of case law begins to form, solutions to 
pending disputes could be justified by reference to earlier judgments, thus granting them 
status of precedents16 with binding force17, i.e., stare decisis. However, not all parts of a 
judgment have precedential value. Only the key factual points or chains of reasoning in a 
case that drives the final judgment or ratio decidendi18 can have it. As Koopmans says “the 
                                                          
7 Precedents understood as cases or issues decided by a court that can be used to help to answer future legal 
questions, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/precedent (accessed March 13, 2015). 
8 https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis (accessed March 13, 2015). 
9 Luanratana, Woraboon & Romano, Alessandro, “Stare Decisis in the WTO: Myth, Dream, or a Siren’s Song?” 
Journal of World Trade 48, no. 4 (2014). p. 775. 
10 Kuzenski, W. F., “Stare Decisis”, Marquette Law Review, Vol. 6, Issue 2, Art. 1, (1922), p. 65. 
11 https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis (accessed March 13, 2015). 
12 Roscoe, Pound, “What of Stare Decisis?”, 10 Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1941), p.2. 
13 Ibid., p.5. 
14 Ibid., p. 5. 
15 Kuzenski, W. F., Op. cit., f. n. 10, p. 65. 
16 Tridimas, Takis, Op. cit., f. n. 1, p. 3. 
17 Tjong Tjin Tai, Eric & Karlijn Teuben, “European Precedent Law”, 16 European Review of Private Law, 
Issue 5, (2008), p. 828. The binding force of precedents applies on lower (vertical stare decisis) and equal 
(horizontal stare decisis) courts that thanks to certain circumstances they were required to apply the same ratio 
decidenti to subsequent similar cases. See: Luanratana, Woraboon & Romano, Alessandro, Op. cit., f. n. 9, pp. 
775-776. 
18 https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ratio_decidendi (accessed March 13, 2015).  
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notion of ratio decidendi is probably the crux of the doctrine of stare decisis […] the only 
part of a previous decision which is binding is its reason for deciding”19. 
 The ratio decidendi of the ultimate court of review binds all inferior courts of that 
jurisdiction, as well as the court itself in future cases involving from the legal issue of the 
decision rendered20. Hence, judges should emphasize the ratio decidendi of every case21. 
Although, in practice, courts seldom introduce the ratio with words like “here comes the 
ratio”, and so lawyers and subsequent judges should delineate the ratio of a previous case22. 
 Unlike common-law systems, in the EU, the ECJ does not follow a formal doctrine 
of stare decisis. This means the ECJ is not strictly bound to its own case law. However, as a 
matter of practice, the ECJ seldom depart from it23. Rather it operates a de facto stare decisis. 
This is confirmed by former AG and judge Slynn, who says: 
The Court may never refer to stare decisis or the doctrine of precedent, or be 
strictly bound by its own decisions, yet in general it clearly does follow them … 
There are passages in the judgements where the weights and the number of the 
previous decisions seen almost to be felt to be such as to make them binding in 
fact, if not in theory24. 
 Operating a de facto stare decisis allows the ECJ to discretionally decide whether it 
should apply former decisions to the immediate case or not25. This is in line with other legal 
systems, such as in the US where the Supreme Court has said that "stare decisis is not a 
universal and inexorable command”26. Also, it appears to be a broad consensus across legal 
systems that judges (especially courts of last resort) may enjoy flexibility in departing from 
their own precedents27. This is because too much adherence to precedents could result in risk 
                                                          
19 Koopmans, T., “Stare Decisis in European Law” in D. O’ Keeffe & H. Schermers (eds.), Essays in European 
Law and Integration, Deventer, Kluwer, (1982), p. 22. 
20 Roscoe Pound, Op. cit., f. n. 12, p. 6. 
21 Luanratana, Woraboon & Romano, Alessandro, Op. cit., f. n. 9, p. 775  
22 Beck, Gunnar, The legal reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU. n.p.: Oxford: Hart, (2012). p. 242. 
23 Ibid., p. 234. In this regard, Beck also shows that “in 2011 the Court handed down 314 judgments which are 
available in English. Of those, the Court referred at least once to its own previous decision in 303 cases, i.e., in 
around 96.5 per cent of all cases decided […]. It may be an indication of the canonical status of the Court’s case 
law”. See: Ibid., p. 239. 
24 Ibid. p. 238. 
25 Luanratana, Woraboon & Romano, Alessandro, Op. cit., f. n. 9, p. 775. 
26 U.S. Supreme Court, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (Nos. 91-744, 91-902), p. 
955. 
27 Tridimas, Takis, Op. cit., f. n. 1, p. 5. 
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of stagnation28, particularly when the decision was correct at the time it was delivered, yet it 
became outdated due to changes in the values of the society, in the world, or an improvement 
in quality of information29. 
 In this sense, it must be said that ECJ’s case law bears a declaratory character; namely 
its judgments are seen as determining best interpretation of the EU Law30. They are not 
sources of law as premises from which norms derive their validity, because they are 
interpretative rather than normative in nature31. The lack of a formal doctrine of stare decisis 
in Union Law causes that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between the ratio decidendi 
and the obiter dicta32 of the ECJ’s judgments33. In practical terms, this means that every 
statement in a sentence has, in principle, the same persuasive value34. 
 Notwithstanding, when courts does not follow previous ratio decidendi, they must 
have either a special justification or a cogent reason to do so35. This is in the best interest of 
legal certainty and of the orderly development of the ECJ’s case law36. In this sense, it is 
worth to recall what the European Court of Human Rights has stated: 
It is true that, […] the Court is not bound by its previous judgments. […] 
However, it usually follows and applies its own precedents, such a course being 
in the interests of legal certainty and the orderly development of the Convention 
case-law. Nevertheless, this would not prevent the Court from departing from an 
earlier decision if it was persuaded that there were cogent reasons for doing so37. 
 In the same vein, Tridimas stresses that “sticking to precedent is a value in itself and 
there must be an interest outweighing that value to persuade the court to overrule”38. This is 
                                                          
28 Ibid., p. 5. 
29 Luanratana, Woraboon & Romano, Alessandro, Op. cit., f. n. 9, p. 10. 
30 Tridimas, Takis, Op. cit., f. n. 1, p. 3. 
31 Ibid., p. 3. 
32 Obiter dicta may be defined as: Remarks of a judge which are not necessary to reaching a decision, but are 
made as comments, illustrations, or thoughts. See https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/obiter_dicta Definition 
from Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary (accessed March 13, 2015). 
33 Beck, Gunnar, Op. cit., f. n. 22., p.242 
34 Ibid., p.242. 
35 Tridimas, Takis, Op. cit., f. n. 1, p. 5. 
36 Ibid., p. 5. 
37 European Court of Human Rights, Cossey v. The United Kingdom, application no. 10843/84, para 35. 
38 Tridimas, Takis, Op. cit., f. n. 1, p. 5. 
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because reliance on precedents enhances predictability, foreseeability, and fairness of law, 
which are elements promoting legal certainty39. 
 To sum up, stare decisis is a doctrine or technique whereby judges rely on their 
previous decisions, so that to solve a legal controversy. In the EU, unlike common-law 
systems, the ECJ is not bound by its precedents. Nonetheless, the ECJ rarely does not follow 
its previous cases, operating a de facto stare decisis. However, in order to respect the 
principle of legal certainty, it is desirable that the ECJ stick to them, unless there is a reason 
which justifies departing from them. 
 In the next section, I discuss precisely the principle of legal certainty. First, I point 
out its character as a general principle of the EU Law. Second, I define its scope of application 
in the EU Law. Third, I present the two aspects of this principle, i.e., foreseeable and rational-
justificatory. Finally, I show the interaction between these aspects of legal certainty and hard 
cases. 
 
3. Principle of legal certainty  
  
 Legal certainty is a recognized general principle of the EU Law40. It is, therefore, a 
source of EU Law in the sense of a rule upon which ECJ can base its legal reasoning41.As a 
general principle of EU Law, legal certainty is given a hierarchical level of primary law42, 
which means that it binds upon EU institutions and Member States, because primary law 
                                                          
39 Tridimas, Takis, Op. cit., f. n. 1, p. 4 and 14; and E. Paunio, “Beyond Predictability –Reflections on Legal 
Certainty and the Discourse Theory of Law in the EU Legal Order” 10 German Law Journal, (2009), p. 1492. 
40 Portuese, Aurelien (et. al.), “The Principle of Legal Certainty as a Principle of Economic Efficiency”, 
Research Paper No. 13-13, University of Westminster School of Law, p. 3. See also Juha Raitio, Op. cit. f. n. 6, 
p. 103. In some jurisdictions, however, such as in the UK there seems to be a preference to call this principle 
as rule of law. See: Juha Raitio, Op. cit. f. n. 6, 83. Also, general principles of EU Law embody grounds for 
judicial review that provides the framework within which courts exercise their powers. See: Raitio, Juha, Op. 
cit., f. n. 6, p. 109. General principles of EU Law may be defined as general propositions for interpretation, 
thanks to which the ECJ resolve a case by deducing from the existing rules a rule which is in conformity with 
the objectives of the EU Law. See: Tridimas, Takis. The general principles of EU law. n.p.: Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, (2006), p. 26. See also article 2 of the TEU. 
41 Semmelmann, C. "General Principles in EU Law between a Compensatory Role and an Intrinsic 
Value." European Law Journal 19, no. 4 (2013): p 469. 
42 Wimmer, Michael. "Dinghy's Rudder: General Principles of European Union Law through the Lens of 
Proportionality, European Public Law no. 2 (2014): p. 333. 
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delimit the EU’s legal framework of action43. However, it is not clear whether it can enforce the 
ECJ in the same terms44, inasmuch as this principle derives from ECJ’s case law45, which, as 
it has been shown, does not formally oblige the ECJ, yet I would argue that its observance is 
at least desirable, in order to safeguard its legal status in the EU Law, otherwise its very 
nature as source of law may be jeopardized46.   
 In the EU, the principle of legal certainty ensures that situations and legal 
relationships governed by Community Law remain foreseeable47, as to that legal effects of 
the application of law must be predictable48. In the words of Tridimas, this expresses that 
those subject to the EU Law must know what the law is, so that they will be able to plan their 
actions accordingly49. Legal certainty encompasses also the principle of legitimate 
expectations, which provides that “those who act reasonably and in good faith on the basis 
of the law as it is or at least seems to be should not suffer from disappointment of those 
expectations”50. In this sense, legitimate expectations protect an individual citizen’s legal 
status51, against authorities which have created a situation, for a considerable period of time, 
on which citizens can rely52. This is particularly relevant, for instance, for taxpayers, because, 
for them to ascertain unequivocally their rights and obligations, legal effects must be clear 
and precise53. 
 In the same vein, Aarnio sets forth that legal certainty covers two substantial elements. 
First, the demands that arbitrariness be avoided, and, second, that the decisions be proper54. 
Regarding the former, courts’ judgements should be foreseeable in the way that citizens are 
                                                          
43 Craig, Paul & Gráinne De Búrca. EU law: text, cases, and materials. n.p.: Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
(2011). p. 109. See also: Raitio, Juha, Op. cit., f. n. 6, p. 83. 
44 Raitio, Juha, Op. cit., f. n. 6, p. 86 
45As Raitio points out “the case law of the ECJ is an important source of law as far as legal certainty is 
concerned, because the principle has not been defined in the EC Treaty or in secondary legislation” See: Raitio, 
Juha, Op. cit., f. n. 6, pp. 86. However,  
46 Ibid., pp. 86-87. 
47 Case 13/61 Bosch p. 52, Case C- 239/86 Ireland v Commission, para 17, and Joined cases C-9/97 and C-
118/97 Jokela & Pitkäranta, para 48. 
48 Raitio, Juha, Op. cit., f. n. 6, p. 128 
49 Tridimas, Takis, Op. cit., f. n. 40, p. 242.  
50 Raitio, Juha, Op. cit., f. n. 6, p. 200. 
51 Ibid., p. 200. 
52 Ibid., p. 204. 
53 Case T-115/94 Opel Austria v Council, para 17.  
54 Aarnio, Aulis, Op. cit., f. n. 4, p.3 
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able to plan their own activities on a rational basis55. Considering the later, it is expected that 
courts expose argumentative vehicles56, rationally justifying their judgments57. 
 In this regard, the ECJ should elaborate its precedents with a minimum of 
consistency58, but enjoying so much flexibility as they need to avoid any risk of stagnation, 
so that cases would not be ruled in an outdated way. In this sense, consistency safeguards the 
principle of legal certainty, leading to the foreseeability of the law, so that persons can plan 
their activities more careful for achieving a better outcome in the future (foreseeable aspect 
of legal certainty)59. On the other hand, rational justification enhances the rational 
acceptability of the audience to which the judgments are addressed60, in such a way that the 
majority of recipients of courts’ legal reasoning reach a state of maximum consensus as to 
agree on that is right an offered interpretation (rational-justificatory aspect of legal 
certainty)61. This is because rational acceptability, as Aarnio refers, is a kind of rationality 
which is the basis of human understanding and the basis of acceptability62, creating the 
credibility on which citizens’ confidence rest63, because, as Koopmans refers, if ECJ does 
not respect legal certainty, predictability of law will diminish64. 
 Likewise, the foreseeable and the rational-justificatory aspects of legal certainty 
converge as vehicles for enhancing legal certainty in cases in which lex non clara est. These 
cases are called ‘hard cases’65, because the solution to their legal controversy at hand depends 
upon finding the rational interpretation of a norm, whose meaning may not be clear due to 
                                                          
55 Aarnio, Aulis, Op. cit., f. n. 4, p.4. In this regard, Dewey also says that judicial decisions should possess the 
maximum possible regularity in order to enable persons to plan their conduct and to foresee the legal importance 
of their acts. See: Dewey, John, "Logical Method and Law" in MacCormick, Neil, and Aulis Aarnio. Legal 
reasoning. n.p.: Aldershot: Dartmouth, Vol. II, cop. (1992), p. 49. 
56 Wroblewski, Jerzy, “Legal Language and Legal Interpretation”, in MacCormick, Neil, and Aulis 
Aarnio, Legal reasoning. n.p.: Aldershot: Dartmouth, Vol. II, cop. (1992), p. 407. 
57 Alexy, Robert, A theory of legal argumentation: the theory of rational discourse as theory of legal 
justification. n.p.: Oxford: Oxford University Press; (2010). p. 191. Thereon, Alexy points out that anybody 
who makes an assertions implicitly claims that what is being said can be justified. In this sense, those who assert 
something must give reasons for what he or she asserts when asked to do so, unless he or she can cite reasons 
which justify a refusal to provide a justification. See: Ibid., pp. 191-192. 
58 Koopmans, T., Op. cit., f. n. 19, p. 27. 
59 Tridimas, Takis, Op. cit., f. n. 40, p. 242. 
60 Aarnio, Aulis, Op. cit., f. n. 4, p. 188. 
61 Ibid., p. 221 et seq.  
62 Ibid., p. 189. 
63 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
64 Koopmans, T., Op. cit., f. n. 19, p. 27. See also in this regard Tridimas, Takis, Op. cit., f. n. 1, p. 4. 
65 Bengoetxea, Joxerramon. The legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice: towards a European 
jurisprudence. n.p.: Oxford: University Press, (1993). p. 171. 
16 
 
polysemy, vagueness, generality and ambiguity of its terms66. To decide hard cases, judges 
are required to elaborate arguments beyond the purely analytic and deductive reasoning in 
the form of syllogism67. This is, in terms of Bengoetxea, a justification of second-order, 
which involve elements of foreseeability and rationality. These are68: 
 Consistency of the decision with pre-established law69;  
 Coherence with established law; and 
 Consequentialist reasonings.  
 Considering the former, it is to conceive that the ECJ will not incur in contradictions 
with established case law70, unless there is a cogent reason to do so71. With respect to the 
second, the ECJ should show that its ruling follows law as it stands in a way in which it 
exhibits acceptable balance or fits with relevant principles72. Last but not least, regarding the 
third, ECJ’s decisions ought to display that decisions took in the ruling are preferable to any 
alternative73. 
 However, as I referred above, rational justification is meant to convince an audience 
about the rightness of a particular interpretation. And so, due to the peculiarities of the 
audience in the EU74, the ECJ should solve hard cases not only with the aforementioned 
elements, but also complement them with a combination of logos, ethos and pathos 
arguments75, so that to enhance legal certainty. The first kind of argument aims to convince 
                                                          
66 Bengoetxea, Joxerramon, Op. cit., f. n. 65, p. 168. Bengoetxea mention another reasons for considering a 
case as hard, for instance: conflict of norms (antinomies); the case cannot be subsumed under any of the existing 
valid norms and yet it seems to be a legally relevant case; and it may be that the decisions adoptable does not 
seem to fit with existing law, and yet the solution appears to be just r acceptable to the legal community. 
However, I focus on hard cases as those who aim to interpret norms whose meaning is wide as it is the case of 
the concept of economic activity under the second subparagraph of article 9(1) of the VAT Directive. 
67 Ibid., p. 169. 
68 Although Bengoetxea here refers to binding law in the sense of enforceable. I consider that this can also apply 
to precedents, since they are also source of law, even in the EU, despite its interpretative character. See: Ibid., 
p. 171. 
69 Despite Bengoetxea refers to consistency to binding law, I consider that consistency also applies to the non-
binding ECJ’s case law, because, as it was argued, ECJ’s system of precedents enhances the principle of legal 
certainty.  
70 Ibid., p. 171 
71 As it is seen here, the second-order of justification in its consistency sphere converges with the foreseeable 
aspect of legal certainty. Therefore, it can be said that the foreseeable aspect complements to the rational 
acceptability of courts decisions. 
72 Bengoetxea, Joxerramon. Op. cit., f. n. 65, p. 171 
73 Ibid., p. 171. 
74 E. Paunio, Op. cit., f. n., 39,  p. 1484. 
75 Ibid., p. 1488. I would like to clarify that although Bengoetxea argues that the aforementioned justification 
can be reached following Wróblewski’s formula for second-order of justification, which targets to fully 
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an audience of the factuality, accuracy and logic of meaningful reasons in support of a 
decision; namely that conclusions follow from precise assumptions and factual information76. 
The second kind of argument attempts to persuade the audience based on the court’s 
authority, i.e., through the analogical use of precedents77. Yet authoritative use of precedents 
should be avoided. Therefore, courts should explain why they use or not a particular case as 
precedent78. The third kind of argument is meant to influence the audience by appealing to 
emotions or values79. The combination of these arguments is especially important when the 
task of a court is not only to rationally establish an acceptable decision, but also to succeed 
in persuading its audience appealing to emotions or political reasons, as it is for the ECJ80. 
This is because logos arguments alone might not be sufficient to convince a diverse 
(culturally and linguistically) audience81, as well as a decision based only on a mixture of 
just ethos and pathos arguments would not establish a connection between them and the 
factual situation to which they are applied82. 
 In the EU Law, the ECJ should convince an audience that is both multicultural and 
multilingual83 of the rightness of its interpretation, so that cultural prejudices for 
understanding and interpreting legal texts can be avoided84, and a rational consensus can be 
achieved85. 
                                                          
undertake all aspects to solve a hard case, among others: the analysis of empirical and legal rules of evidence, 
evaluations of evidence and of consequences, directives for the choice of consequences and evaluations of 
consequences. (Ibid., p. 171), this work will not consider this formula, unlike the elements for a justification of 
second-order exposed by Bengoetxea, since the formula is not applicable for the purpose of identifying the 
guidelines in the ECJ’s case law of the concept of economic and the reasons why the ECJ should follow them. 
Therefore, in the analysis of the elements for a second-order of justification, which enhance legal certainty, I 
rather consider the examination set forth by Paunio, since her approach is based on the presumption that the 
ECJ can, by way of argumentation, assure more legal certainty. See E. Paunio, Op. cit., f. n., 39, p. 1470. 
76 E. Paunio, Op. cit., f. n., 39, p. 1487. Logos in this sense are also part of the rational justificatory aspect. 
77 Ibid., p. 1486. 
78 Ibid., p. 1486. 
79 Ibid., p. 1486. 
80 Ibid., p. 1487-1488. 
81 Ibid., p. 1487. 
82 Ibid., p. 1488. 
83 Ibid., p. 1488. This could be classified in terms of Aarnio as a particular audience. A particular and at the 
same time concrete audience is composed of those persons who fulfill the characteristics set for the audience to 
whom a standpoint on a certain problem in the interpretation of law has been presented. The elements are: 
a) The members of the audience are bound to the rules of rational discourse. 
b) The members have adopted common values. 
c) The audience is tied to a certain form of life 
See Aarnio, Aulis, Op. cit., f. n. 4,  p. 223. 
84 E. Paunio, Op. cit., f. n., 39, p. 1488. 
85 Aarnio, Aulis, Op. cit., f. n. 4, p. 226. 
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 The ECJ’s audience is composed by: 
 Institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the EU86. 
 National courts of MS under the acte clair/acte éclairé doctrine87 
 EU persons which are entitled to rely on the vertical direct effect of EU Law88  
 ECJ’s judgments are addressed to one or to a combination of the aforementioned 
bodies. And, since the ECJ has jurisdiction to ensure that the interpretation and application 
of the Union Law be observed89, all bodies listed above are bound by ECJ’s interpretation on 
the EU Law, and, consequently, have a particular interest that ECJ’s judgments fulfill the 
requirements of legal certainty, so that to reach foreseeability and rational acceptability of a 
legal decision‐making90. This will happen if the ECJ: 
 Decide hard cases in accordance with the second-order of justification elements, and  
 Considers logos, ethos and pathos arguments, when elaborating its decisions.  
 In this regard, following the foreseeable and the rational-justificatory aspects of legal 
certainty, ECJ decisions will not seem to be arbitrary dicta. This will enable persons to plan 
better their conducts considering the legal consequences of their acts; it will reduce 
economical costs like collecting information; and EU’s audience will reach a state of 
maximum consensus as to agree on that is right an offered interpretation.  
 However, as Beck argues, although the ECJ seldom depart from its case law, from 
time to time it does not steadily follows them in a structured manner91 (foreseeability aspect 
of legal certainty). This is either because, as I aforementioned, the ECJ is not bound to its 
own case law, or because of its high level of discretion92, or because of a lack of discursive 
                                                          
86 Article 267 of the TFEU. 
87 National courts and MS are constrained to adhere to ECJ’s case law. Therefore, they have the duty to interpret 
national law in conformity with EU Law. This can be traced in case Da Costa, where the ECJ determined that 
the obligation for national courts or tribunals of last instance to request for preliminary rulings may be deprived 
when the ECJ has already given an interpretation on the issue to be asked  (Joined Cases 28, 29 and 30/62 Da 
Costa, Venlo, and Hoechst-Holland N.V). This is known as the acte clair doctrine. This was further confirmed 
in case CILFIT, where the ECJ affirmed that when a materially identical question has already been the subject 
of a similar case, there is no obligation for domestic courts to request for a preliminary ruling (Case C- 283/81 
CILFIT, paras 13-14. This is called acte éclairé doctrine. See more on this in Ilija, Vukčević, 'CILFIT Criteria 
for the Acte Clair/Acte Éclairé Doctrine in Direct Tax Cases of the CJEU', 40 Intertax, Issue 12, (2012), pp. 
654–665. 
88 Craig, Paul & Gráinne De Búrca, Op. cit., f. n. 43, p. 106. 
89 Articles 19 and 267 of the TFEU.  
90 E. Paunio, Op. cit., f. n. 39, p. 1469. 
91 Beck, Gunnar, Op. cit., f. n. 22, p. 249. 
92 Ibid., p. 250.  
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reasoning93 (rational-justificatory aspect of legal certainty), which, however legally justified, 
could diminish legal certainty. Also, the ECJ structures its own case law through “building 
blocks”94. This means that the ECJ elaborates its precedents referring and citing relevant 
paragraphs from previous decisions, while summarizing relevant arguments of them, yet it, 
in some occasions, does not provide ethos arguments, which distinguish the reasons whereby 
the ECJ decided to refer a particular judgment95, which might be also considered as a lack of 
logos argumentation, together with an authoritative use of ethos arguments. 
 Accordingly, if ECJ does not justify its decisions, sticking to a line of case law or not 
reasoning exposing its discourse, a potential harm towards achieving legal certainty might 
arise, which, in turn, would make hard for individuals to rely on ECJ’ decisions with a high 
degree of confidence. However, I cannot think that persons be able to invoke a breach of this 
principle by the ECJ in order to claim for damages, inasmuch as the case law of ECJ is not a 
source of law for the ECJ, since it is not bound by its precedents, as, for example, when other 
authority of the EU acts against general principles of law96.   
 In the next section, I proceed to analyze the general guidelines for determining 
whether an economic activity, as described under the second subparagraph of article 9(1) of 
the VAT Directive, is of an economic nature. Thereon, the ECJ has elaborated a “building 
block” of continuity which allows to determine the economic nature of an activity. 
Nonetheless, there have been cases in the field of the VAT regime applicable to public bodies, 
in which the ECJ has not stuck to such guidelines without providing a cogent reason for doing 
so. This cannot be seen as an illegal act by the ECJ, but rather, an area in which flexibility 
and discretion enjoyed by the ECJ collides with the principle of legal certainty. To that end, 
I recall the cases which, in my opinion, illustrate best the referred guidelines, so that to bring 
a clear image of the role of this concept in the VAT Directive.  
  
                                                          
93 Yet, in some cases, the ECJ does engage in detailed examination of earlier judgments and this makes a more 
transparent and persuasive judicial law making. See: Tridimas, Takis, Op. cit., f. n. 1, p. 7. 
94 Beck, Gunnar, Op. cit., f. n. 22, p. 245. 
95 Ibid., p. 245. 
96 Raitio, Juha, Op. cit., f. n. 6, p. 102. 
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4. The concept of economic activity 
 
 Economic activity is a concept defined under the second subparagraph of article 9(1) 
of the VAT Directive, which reads: 
Any activity of producers, traders or persons supplying services, including 
mining and agricultural activities and activities of the professions, shall be 
regarded as ‘economic activity’. The exploitation of tangible or intangible 
property for the purposes of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis 
shall in particular be regarded as an economic activity. 
 This definition should be understood considering two other inter-connected concepts. 
These are taxable transaction and taxable person97. The former displays the transactions 
within the scope of the EU VAT System, i.e., supply of goods or of services, as well as the 
intra-Community acquisition of goods effected for consideration, and the importation of 
goods98. The second defines those who carry on the transactions subject to VAT, provided 
that they execute them independently99. 
 In this sense, the concept of economic activity is crucial in the EU VAT system. 
Therefore, its importance lies, for example, when determining whether a person is a taxable 
person100, or whether his transactions fall on the VAT scope, or whether a taxable person has 
a right to deduct input VAT. 
 Furthermore, this concept encompasses all transactions in the form of supply of goods 
or services, or exploitation of property. That is why it is possible to think it as comprising all 
transactions performed by a taxable person, which lie within the VAT Directive scope. This 
is because this concept is very wide and it is applied whatever the legal form of the activity101, 
for its character is objective, in the sense that the activity is considered per se and without 
regard to its purpose or results102. Consequently, even activities whose sole purpose is to 
                                                          
97 Case C-408/97 Commission v Netherlands, paras 23-25. 
98 Article 2(1) of the VAT Directive. 
99 Article 9(1) of the VAT Directive. 
100 Joined Cases C-180/10 and C-181/10 Słaby, para 43. In this regard the ECJ said “It is the existence of such 
an activity [economic] which establishes the status of ‘taxable person’”. Ibid., para 43. 
101 Terra, Ben & Kajus Julie, Introduction to European VAT (recast), IBFD, (2014), p.292. 
102 Case 235/85 Commission v Netherlands, para 8. See also, Case C-408/97 Commission v Netherlands, para 
25 and Case C-223/03 University of Huddersfield, para 47.  
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obtain a tax advantage103, or supplies by thieves and fences104 may be considered as economic 
activities. 
 However, only if the activities are of an economic nature, they are enshrined in the 
scope of the VAT Directive105. For this matter, it must be examined whether the activity 
meets with the following criteria: 
 Whether the activity has a sufficient degree of permanence, in the sense that is carried 
out  for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis106; 
 Whether the activity is carried out in return for consideration107; 
 Whether the activity has a direct link between the supply provided and the 
consideration received108;  
 I call these guidelines the economic-nature criteria, in as much as they serve as 
parameters to determine the economic substance of a particular transaction. Also, these 
criteria were abstracted from hard cases109, as defined above, in which the interpretation of 
                                                          
103 Case C-255/02 Halifax, para 59. 
104 Terra, Ben, Op. cit., f. n. 101, p. 314. 
105 In this regard AG Maduro said “in principle even unlawful transactions fall within the scope of the Sixth 
Directive and are subject to VAT. The only exception is when an activity falls completely outside the lawful 
economic sector. But that exception relates only to trade in goods or services which are subject to a total 
prohibition in the Community and which, by their very nature and because of their special characteristics, cannot 
be fully marketed or introduced into economic channels.” see. AG Opinion Case C-255/02 Halifax, para 45. 
See also: Case C-306/94. Régie Dauphinoise para 15; AG Opinion Case C‐246/08 Commission v Finland f.n. 
51; and Case C-284/04 T-Mobile, para 34. 
106 Case 235/85 Commission v Netherlands, para 9, Case 408/06 Götz, para 18, Case C-246/08 Commission v 
Finland paras 40-41, and Joined Cases C- 180/10 and C- 181/10 Słaby, para 45. 
107 Case 89/81 Hong Kong para 10, Case C-77/01 EDM para 49, Case 408/06 Götz, para 18. Therein, the ECJ 
stated that, “if the national court finds that both criteria for an economic activity, namely its permanence and 
the receipt of remuneration in consideration for the activity, have not been met, then the activity […] should 
not be regarded as an economic activity and, consequently, would not be covered by the Sixth Directive”, see 
Case C-408/06 Götz, para 22.  
108 Case C-154/80 Coöperative para 12, Case C- 102/86 Apple & Pear, paras 11-12, and  Case C-16/93 Tolsma, 
para 13. 
109 Likewise, I would like to underline two important aspects about these criteria. First, they are neither 
immutable, nor applied in absolute terms; for instance, regarding the criterion of the degree of permanence, 
article 12 of the VAT Directive mentions that MS may regard as a taxable person anyone who carries out, on 
an occasional basis, a transaction relating to the activities referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) 
thereof. In the same vein, supplies carried out free of charge by a taxable person for his private use or for that 
of his staff or, more generally, for purposes other than those of his business, in terms of article 16 and 26 of the 
VAT Directive, shall be deemed as supplies for consideration. Second, these are not the only parameters which 
determine whether an activity is of an economic nature. There are additional criteria, which depending on the 
particular circumstances of each case, should also be taken into account, but, in any case the referred economic-
nature criteria should also be present, among of which I can list:  
 Whether a taxable person has acquired goods or has used property for the purposes of his economic 
activities, see Case C-230/94 Renate Enkler, paras 26-27. 
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the concept of economic activity, laid down in the second subparagraph of article 9(1)110 of 
the VAT Directive, was the key element for solving the legal issue. In this sense, if a 
particular activity does not meet one or more of the aforementioned criteria, it will not be 
regarded as an activity of economic nature111. This is because supplies which are 
sporadically, free of charge or lacking of a link between the supply and the payment are 
considered as not subject to the scope of the VAT Directive112.  
 However, I consider these criteria can be better illustrated in the context of the cases 
in which they were pronounced. Therefore, I proceed to examine them113. 
 
4.1. Whether the activity has a sufficient degree of permanence, in the 
sense that is carried out  for the purpose of obtaining income 
therefrom on a continuing basis 
 
 The ECJ has referred to this criterion in the context of, among other cases, 
Commission v Netherlands114, Götz115 and Słaby & Kuć116.  
  
                                                          
 Whether the transaction constitutes the mere exercise of the right of ownership by its holder, see Case 
C-155/94 Wellcome Trust, para 32. 
 Whether the purpose of the activity is not solely to acquire holdings in other undertakings, without the 
taxable person involving itself directly or indirectly in the management of those undertakings,  Case 
C-60/90, Polysar, para 17. 
 Whether the activity satisfies the objective criteria on which it is based, even if it is carried out with 
the sole aim of obtaining a tax advantage, without any other economic objective, see Case C-255/02 
Halifax, para 58. 
 Whether preparatory acts, such as the acquisition of assets must themselves be treated as constituting 
economic activity, provided that it is specifically suited to commercial exploitation, see Case C-268/83 
Rompelman, paras 22-25. 
 In any case, in terms of the ECJ, as a general rule, an activity is categorized as economic if it is 
permanent and is carried out in return for remuneration which is received by the person carrying out the activity. 
See Case C- 246/08 Commission v Finland, para 37. 
110 Although in the context of the cases listed herewith, it is referred to Article 4(2) Of The Sixth Vat Directive 
111 Case C- 246/08 Commission v Finland, para 37 
112 Case C- 89/81 Hong Kong para 10. Likewise, illegal transactions fall outside the scope of the VAT, such as 
the importation and supply of drugs, even when such sales are not systematically prosecuted in a Member State, 
and the importation of counterfeit currency notes. See: Terra, Ben, Op. cit., f. n. 102, p. 314. 
113 I would like to clarify that since this is not an examination of a particular controversy, and the criteria listed 
above has been referred by the ECJ in numerous cases, I would only refer to those judgements which I consider 
are more relevant for explaining the particular criterion I explain. 
114 Case C-235/85 Commission v Netherlands. 
115 Case C-408/06 Götz. 
116 Joined Cases C 180/10 and C 181/10 Słaby. 
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4.1.1. Commission v Netherlands 
 
 The dispute on the first case concerns the issue of whether the official services 
performed by notaries and bailiffs are subject to VAT117. Thereon, the Commission 
maintained that notaries and bailiffs in the Netherlands should have been subject to VAT 
within Article 4(1) of the Sixth VAT Directive118, inasmuch as they carried out their activities 
free from any relationship of subordination, in a permanent way and for consideration119. 
However, the Netherlands Government argued that they did not carry out activities governed 
by normal economic laws but, in return for remuneration fixed by a statute, and, also, that 
the services provided were concerning reasons of public interest120. The ECJ solved that 
notaries and bailiffs executed their activities on a permanent basis and in return for 
remuneration, thus those transactions were deemed as economic activities121 under article 
4(2) of the Sixth VAT Directive122. Yet, this single criterion was not sufficient for 
considering those as taxable persons. That is why it was analyzed whether they carried out 
their activities independently. In this regard, the ECJ confirmed that, since notaries and 
bailiffs are neither bound to the public authorities as employees, nor integrated into the public 
administration, they executed their activities on their own account and on their own 
responsibility123. This, in turn, excludes the possibility of considering that notaries and 
bailiffs exercised their powers as public authorizes, and so they could not enjoy the 
exemption for public bodies124 of article 4(5) of the Sixth VAT Directive125. Therefore, the 
ECJ concluded that notaries and bailiffs engaged in economic activities, which should have 
been subject to VAT, so that the Netherlands had failed to fulfil its obligations under the 
VAT Directive126. 
  
                                                          
117 Case C-235/85 Commission v Netherlands, para 3 
118 Article 9(1) of the VAT Directive 
119 Case C-235/85 Commission v Netherlands, para 4. 
120 Ibid., para 5. 
121 Ibid., para 9. 
122 The second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of the VAT Directive. 
123 Case C-235/85 Commission v Netherlands, para 14. 
124 Ibid., para 22. 
125 Article 13(1) of the VAT Directive. 
126 Case C-235/85 Commission v Netherlands, para 23. 
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4.1.2. Götz 
 
 The second case concerns a controversy related with the issuance of an invoice, 
related to the sale of a delivery reference quantity of cow’s milk, without a separate statement 
of the VAT127. The issue arose when the Landesanstalt (regional body responsible for food 
of Bavaria) centralized the applications of different milk producers in order to establish those 
who wanted to sell delivery reference quantities and those who wanted to buy them, so that 
surpluses of cow’s milk could be reduced128. Mr. Götz, a milk producer, purchased a delivery 
reference quantity to the Landesanstalt, which issued an invoice, yet it did not show the VAT 
separately from the selling price129. Therefore, Mr. Götz lodged an administrative objection 
to the Landesanstalt asking for an invoice in which VAT was shown130. However, the 
authority dismissed that objection on the grounds of its status as a public authority and its 
role as a mere intermediary131. Given these circumstances, the Bundesfinanzhof (Federal 
Finance Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer several questions to the ECJ for 
a preliminary ruling. The first question was whether a milk-quota sales point is an agricultural 
intervention agency, or a staff shop132 under Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive, read in 
conjunction with point 7 and 12 of Annex D thereto133. The second question was whether the 
VAT treatment of the Landesanstalt as a non-taxable person would lead to significant 
distortions of competition134 within the second subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth 
Directive135. However, before entering into the discussion of the questions, the ECJ analyzed 
whether the activity of the Landesanstalt was covered by the VAT Directive, as to whether 
it constituted an economic activity under article 4(2) of the Sixth VAT Directive136. In this 
regard, the ECJ determined that if the national court found that the activity at issue was 
carried on permanent (for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing 
                                                          
127 Case C-408/06 Götz, para 2. 
128 Ibid., para 10. 
129 Ibid., para 12. 
130 Ibid., para 12. 
131 Ibid., para 12. 
132 Ibid., para 24. 
133 Third subparagraph of article 13(1), read in conjunction with Annex I, point 7 and 12 of the VAT Directive. 
134 Case C-408/06 Götz para 35 
135 Second subparagraph of article 13(1) of the VAT Directive. 
136 The second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of the VAT Directive 
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basis)137 and in return for remuneration, then it should be regarded as an economic activity138. 
And so, the answer to the questions were as follows: With regard the first question, a milk-
quota sales point is neither an agricultural intervention agency, nor a staff shop139. 
Considering the second question, the treatment of a milk-quota sales point as a non-taxable 
person cannot give rise to significant distortions of competition. This is because the 
Landesanstalt did not face any competition with private operators140. 
 
4.1.3. Słaby & Kuć 
 
 The third case deals with the issue of whether the disposal of several plots of land 
designated for development must be subject to VAT141. However, this case encompasses two 
separate circumstances that, however, were jointly analyzed by the ECJ.  The first one deals 
with Mr. Słaby who, as a natural person, did not carry out an economic activity, but purchased 
land designated for agricultural purposes142. Then, the urban management plan was changed 
(henceforth earmarked for a holiday home development) and Mr. Słaby divided the land into 
64 plots, which he gradually began to sell to natural persons143. Afterwards, the Minister 
Finansów pointed out that those transactions constituted an economic activity under article 
under article 4(2) of the Sixth VAT Directive144. This was for two reasons, first because a 
farmer is a taxable person, and, second because the scale and scope of the planned 
transactions, as well as the division of the land, indicated Mr. Słaby’s intention to make 
repeated sales145. Mr. Słaby brought an action against that interpretation. Ando so, the 
Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme administrative Court) decided to stay the 
proceedings before ECJ146. 
                                                          
137 Case C-408/06 Götz para 18. In this regard, the ECJ formulated that the permanent nature of the activity and 
the income which is obtained from it applies not only to the exploitation of property, but to all of the activities 
referred to in Article 4(2) of the Sixth Directive (now the second subparagraph of article 9(1) of the VAT 
Directive). 
138 Case C-408/06 Götz para 22. 
139 Ibid., para 34. 
140 Ibid., para 46. 
141 Joined Cases C 180/10 and C 181/10 Słaby, para 2. 
142 Ibid., para 12. 
143 Ibid., para 13. 
144 The second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of the VAT Directive. 
145 Joined Cases C 180/10 and C 181/10 Słaby, para 15. 
146 Ibid., para 18. 
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 The second circumstance concerns Mr. and Mrs. Kuć, who were owners of an 
agricultural undertaking purchased as agricultural land not permitted for development147. 
Nevertheless, after a change to the urban management plan (henceforth earmarked for 
residential and service development), they began to sell, on an occasional and non-organized 
basis, certain parts of their undertaking. Those supplies were subject to VAT148. Yet, Mr. and 
Mrs. Kuć claimed that those supplies should not have been subject to VAT, since they 
concern their personal property149. And so, they requested a written interpretation on this 
point. Thereon, the head of that tax office confirmed that the sale of that land constituted a 
supply of goods for consideration and subject to VAT150. In those circumstances, the 
Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny decided to stay the proceedings before the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling. 
 As explained above, the ECJ decided to examine together the question referred by the 
Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny. This was whether a person, who carried out an agricultural 
activity on land purchased VAT-free that, afterwards, was reclassified as land designated for 
development, must be regarded as a taxable person for VAT under article 4(1) of the Sixth 
VAT Directive151, when he begins to sell that land152. In this regard, the ECJ stated that the 
division of land into plots is not decisive, nor is the period over which those transactions take 
place, for considering whether the transactions lie within the scope of VAT Directive, since 
all those circumstances could fall within the scope of the management of the personal 
property153. Rather, when a person takes active steps in management by mobilizing resources 
similar to those deployed by a producer, a trader or a person supplying services154, he must 
be regarded as carrying out an economic activity155. This is the case when a person executes 
the preparatory work to make supply of land designated for development through proven 
marketing measures156; namely taking initiatives that do not normally fall within the scope 
                                                          
147 Joined Cases C 180/10 and C 181/10 Słaby, para 19. 
148 Ibid., para 21. 
149 Ibid., para 22. 
150 Ibid., para 22. 
151 Article 9(1) of the VAT Directive. 
152 Joined Cases C 180/10 and C 181/10 Słaby para 26. 
153 Ibid., para 38. 
154 Ibid., para 39. 
155 Ibid., para 51. This criterion was further confirmed in Case C-263/11 Rēdlihs, para 36. 
156 Ibid., para 40.  
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of the management of personal property157. This is because the mere sale of an asset cannot 
amount to its exploitation, aiming to produce income on a continuing basis158. And so, ECJ 
concluded that the supply of land designated for development must be regarded as subject to 
VAT, to the extent that that transaction does not constitute the mere exercise of the right of 
ownership by its holder159. 
 
4.1.4. Final remarks of this criterion 
 
 The criterion of sufficient degree of permanence requires the activity is carried out 
for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis. Therefore, there should 
be an intention to repeat the economic activity taking active steps by mobilizing resources 
through proven marketing measures. In this sense the mere sale of an asset cannot amount to 
exploitation on a continuing basis, because the notion of permanence does not account for 
activities performed on an isolated way. 
 
4.2. Whether the activity is carried out in return for consideration 
 
 The ECJ has referred to this criterion in the context of case Hong Kong160.  
 
4.2.1. Hong Kong161 
 
 The controversy in this judgment arose when the Netherlands Authorities stopped to 
consider the Hong Kong Trade Council, who habitually provided services free of charge, as 
                                                          
157 Joined Cases C 180/10 and C 181/10 Słaby, para 41. 
158 Ibid., para 45. The ECJ assimilated the criterion of “exploitation of an asset intended to produce income on 
a continuing basis” to the degree of permanence of an activity in Case C-408/06 Götz para 18. Thereon, the ECJ 
pointed out that “The latter criteria [exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purpose of obtaining 
income therefrom on a continuing basis], relating to the permanent nature of the activity and the income which 
is obtained from it, have been treated by the case-law as applying not only to the exploitation of property, but 
to all of the activities referred to in Article 4(2) of the Sixth Directive [now second subparagraph of article 9(1) 
of the VAT Directive”. 
159 Ibid., para 53. 
160 This criterion was addressed also in Coöperatieve and Tolsma. However, I discuss these two cases in when 
I proceed to analyze the criterion regarding the direct link between the supply provided and the consideration 
received in the latter two. 
161 Case 89/81 Hong Kong. 
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a taxable person under article 4(1) of the Sixth VAT Directive162. And so, the tax authorities 
claimed the amount which had been improperly refunded163. In those circumstances the Hoge 
Raad (Supreme Court of the Netherlands) referred the following question to the ECJ: can a 
person who habitually provides services for traders be regarded as a taxable person in the 
event of those services being provided free of charge?164 Thereon, the ECJ concluded that 
when a person’s activity comprises only the supply of services for no direct consideration, 
there is no basis of assessment, and so the free services are not subject to VAT165. This is 
because, in those circumstances, the person providing services becomes the final consumer, 
inasmuch as he is at the final stage of the production and distribution chain166. And so, 
services provided free of charge are to be considered as diverse in character from taxable 
transactions which, assume the stipulation of a price or consideration167. Consequently, the 
Hong Kong Trade Council was not regarded as a taxable person168. 
 
4.2.2. Final remarks of this criterion 
 
 The criterion of consideration here examined assumes the stipulation of a price. 
Therefore, a supply of services free of charge does not bring about any consideration169, since 
there is no basis of assessment. This is in light with article 73 of the VAT Directive which 
states that the taxable amount shall include everything which constitutes consideration 
obtained or to be obtained by the supplier, in return for the supply, from the customer or a 
third party, including subsidies directly linked to the price of the supply. This idea appears 
clearer in the next two cases, which pictures the concept of consideration within notion of 
the direct link between the supply and the consideration. 
  
                                                          
162 Article 9(1) of the VAT Directive. 
163 Case 89/81 Hong Kong, para 3. 
164 Ibid., para 3. 
165 Ibid., para 10. 
166 Ibid., para 10. 
167 Ibid., para 10. 
168 Ibid., para 13. 
169 This is assuming that the supply of services is carried out for business purposes. 
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4.3. Whether there is a direct link between the supply provided and the 
consideration received 
 
 The ECJ has referred to this criterion in the context of case Coöperatieve170 and 
Tolsma171. 
 
4.3.1. Coöperatieve 
 
 The controversy arose when an agricultural cooperative association, which ran a 
potato warehouse, considered that, since its services were provided free of charge, they 
should not be subject to VAT172. Conversely, the tax authorities claimed that the cooperative, 
indeed, had charged to its members something in return of the warehousing; namely the 
reduction in the value of their shares as a result of the non-collection of the storage charges173. 
In order to solve the dispute, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands asked to the ECJ for the 
correct interpretation of the term consideration in the VAT Directive174. Thereon, the ECJ 
noticed that that term encompasses everything received in return for the provision of the 
service which makes up the consideration for the supply175. This is not only the cash of the 
amounts charged, but also the value of the goods received in exchange176. Likewise, there 
must also be a direct link between the service provided and the consideration received177. 
This does not happen when the consideration consists of an unascertained reduction in the 
value of shares possessed by the members of the cooperative, which may not be deemed as 
a payment in exchange of the service178. Furthermore, the consideration for the provision of 
a service must be capable of being expressed in money179. Also, that consideration should 
represent a subjective value. This is because the basis of assessment for the provision of 
services is the payment actually received and not a value assessed according to objective 
                                                          
170 Case C-154/80 Coöperatieve. 
171 Case C- 16/93 Tolsma. 
172 Case C-154/80 Coöperatieve para 2. 
173 Ibid., para 3. 
174 Ibid., para 7. 
175 Ibid., paras 10, 12, 13.  
176 Ibid., para 10. 
177 Ibid., para 12. 
178 Ibid., para 12. 
179 Ibid., para 13. 
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criteria180. And so, the ECJ determined that in the case at hand there is no consideration, as 
long as the cooperative does not impose any storage charge on its members for the service 
provided181. 
 
4.3.2. Tolsma 
  
 The legal issue arose when Mr. Tolsma received an assessment of VAT from the 
Inspector of Turnover Taxes182. He claimed Mr. Tolsma did not accounted VAT for his 
performance as a barrel organ on the public highway in the Netherlands, whereby Mr. Tolsma 
collected donations from passers-by, despite Mr. Tolsma not being able to claim any 
remuneration by right183. In this regard, Mr. Tolsma argued that the sums he received were 
not subject to VAT, inasmuch as there was no obligation whatsoever on passers-by to give 
him donations, whose amount, moreover, they determined themselves184. Conversely, the 
Inspector maintained that there was a direct link between Mr. Tolsma’s activity and the 
payments from the passers-by, regardless he was not entitled to a remuneration185. In those 
circumstances, the Regional Court of Appeal asked, in essence, to the ECJ whether a service, 
for which no payment is stipulated but payment is nevertheless received, can be regarded as 
a supply of services effected for consideration186. In this regard, the ECJ determined, firstly, 
that a supply of services is realized for consideration only if there is a legal relationship 
between the provider of the service and the recipient, pursuant to which there is reciprocal 
performance187. Also, that the remuneration received by the provider constitutes the value 
actually given in return for the service supplied188. Secondly, the ECJ affirmed the donations 
from passers-by cannot should not be deemed as the consideration for a service supplied, 
because there is no legal agreement between the parties, since passers-by freely make a 
donation, whose amount they determine as they wish189. Last but not least, the ECJ pointed 
                                                          
180 Case C-154/80 Coöperatieve, para 13. 
181 Ibid., para 15. 
182 Case C- 16/93 Tolsma para 4. 
183 Ibid., para 3. 
184 Ibid., para 6. 
185 Ibid., para 7. 
186 Ibid., para 8. 
187 Ibid., para 14. 
188 Ibid., para 14. 
189 Ibid., para 17. 
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out that there was no link between the musical service and the payments, inasmuch as the 
passers-by did not ask for Mr. Tolsma to play for them; rather, the sums they paid depended 
not on the musical service but on their subjective motives190. Therefore, the ECJ concluded 
that supply of services effected for consideration does not comprise an activity consisting in 
playing music on the public highway, for which no remuneration is stipulated191. 
 
4.3.3. Final remarks of this criterion 
 
  As I supra referred, Coöperatieve and Tolsma help to better understand the 
concept of consideration. Therefore, it is worth to recall what the ECJ set forth in these cases 
as to that consideration is everything received in return for the provision of the service which 
makes up the payment for the supply. Regarding the direct link, the first to be said is that the 
consideration must be ascertained and be capable of being expressed in money, as well as to 
represent a subjective value, in the sense of the payment actually received and not a value 
assessed according to objective criteria192. Finally, there have to be a legal relationship 
between the provider and the recipient, pursuant to which there is reciprocal performance, 
which characterizes the link in itself. 
 
4.4. Final remarks of the guidelines to assess the concept of economic 
activity 
 
 As seen, the ECJ has employed the economic-nature criteria to determine both 
whether a particular activity is of an economic nature, and, therefore, whether the activity 
falls within VAT scope. Likewise, the ECJ stressed the importance of the concept of 
economic activity when determining whether an activity is subject to VAT, whether the 
activity is taxable, as well as whether a person is taxable and has a right to deduct VAT.  
 The application of the VAT exemption for public bodies under article 13 of the VAT 
Directive is another example of the importance of determining the economic nature of a 
particular activity. As the ECJ has already affirmed, it is required a prior finding that an 
                                                          
190 Case C- 16/93 Tolsma, para 17. 
191 Ibid., para 20. 
192 See also Case C‐40/09 Astra Zeneca, para 28 and Case C-549/11 Orfey para 44. 
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activity pursued by a public body is considered to be of an economic nature for applying this 
fiscal treatment193. However, in certain cases on this matter, when dealing with the referred                        
economic-nature criteria, the ECJ has either departed from or solved not following the 
referred criteria. This has been either because of a lack of consistency with its previous case 
law, or because of authoritative use of precedents, in the sense of not providing a cogent 
reason for not following previous judgements. Either way harming the principle of legal 
certainty, since, first, it does not enable persons to plan their conducts considering the legal 
consequences of their acts. Second, it increases economical costs like collecting information. 
Third, it does not convince the EU audience about the rightness of a particular 
interpretation194.  
 In the next section, I introduce the general aspects of the article 13 of the VAT 
Directive, regarding the VAT treatment of entities governed by public law as public bodies, 
which will help to understand the context under which the cases Commission v Greece, 
Hutchinson & T-Mobile and Commission v Finland were formulated. 
 
5. VAT Treatment of Public Bodies 
 
 In the EU, as a general rule states, regional and local government authorities, as well 
as any other public body are not regarded as taxable persons in respect of the activities or 
transactions in which they engage195. Nonetheless, for this exemption to happen (besides the 
prior finding that the activity pursued by the body is considered to be of an economic nature, 
as above referred) three criteria, regarding public bodies’ transactions, should be analysed, 
all of which laid down in article 13(1) of the VAT Directive. 
  
                                                          
193 Case C-369-04 Hutchinson, para 42 and Case C-284/04 T-Mobile para 48. 
194 As it is was discussed in point 3 of this work. 
195 This exemption, as any other one, is a violation to the fundamentals of VAT, because they infringe upon the 
characteristics of VAT as a consumption-type VAT. See Henkow, Oskar, The VAT/GST Treatment of Public 
Bodies, Kluwer Law International, UK, (2013), p.9. 
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5.1. Whether the public body carried out the activity as public 
authority, governed by public law196 
 
 This criterion lies on the first subparagraph of article 13(1) of the VAT Directive, 
which states that:  
States, regional and local government authorities and other bodies governed by 
public law shall not be regarded as taxable persons in respect of the activities or 
transactions in which they engage as public authorities, even where they collect 
dues, fees, contributions or payments in connection with those activities or 
transactions. 
 Thereon, the ECJ has set forth that VAT exemption for public bodies applies when 
two conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, activities must be carried out by a body governed by 
public law, in the sense that such bodies must execute their activities under a special legal 
regime applicable only to them, and not under the same legal conditions as those that apply 
to private economic operators197. Secondly, activities must be performed by those bodies 
acting as public authorities198. This is the case, for instance, when the realization of the 
activity involves the use of public powers199; when the activity lies within the core 
responsibilities that can never be delegated to private bodies200; when the person that 
performs the activity is part of the public administration201, or when State and citizens are in 
a relationship of superiority/subordination202. Thus, the subject-matter of the activity engaged 
                                                          
196 It is important to highlight that if this criterion is not fulfilled no further examination is required for 
determining the application of the VAT exemption to public bodies (assuming that before entering on the 
discussion of this fiscal treatment for public bodies, the activity was found to be of an economic nature). See, 
for example, Case C-235/85 Commission v Netherlands, para 22. 
197 Case C-446/98 Camara Municipal do Porto, para 17. However, De la Feria considers that, when public 
bodies engage in activities under a special legal regime, it is to be regarded rather as a public body acting as a 
public authority, see De la Feria, Rita, “The EU VAT Treatment of Public Sector Bodies: Slowly Moving in 
the Wrong Direction”, The Netherlands, INTERTAX, Kluwer Law International BV, Volume 37, Issue 3, 
(2009), p. 150.  On the other hand, I deem that this criterion fits under the aspect of body governed by public 
law, since public law governs relations between individuals and the state, as well as between individuals that 
are of direct concern to the state, see Jonathan Law & Elizabeth A. Martin, A Dictionary of Law, 7 ed., Oxford 
University Press Published online, 2014. 
198 Case C-446/98 Camara Municipal do Porto, para 15. 
199 Ibid., para 22 
200 Case C-359/97 Commission v UK, para 37. 
201 Case C-359/97 Commission v UK, para 55. 
202 AG Opinion Case C-369/04 Hutchison, para 109 and AG Opinion Case C-284/04 T-Mobile, para 119. 
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in is not relevant for the purpose of assessing this criterion203. Rather it is the way in which 
the persons execute the activities, i.e., as a public a public or as a private person204. 
 
5.2. Whether public body’s activity lies under the Annex I of the VAT 
Directive 
 
 This criterion is enshrined in the third subparagraph of article 13(1) of the VAT 
Directive which reads:  
In any event, bodies governed by public law shall be regarded as taxable persons 
in respect of the activities listed in Annex I, provided that those activities are not 
carried out on such a small scale as to be negligible. 
 This means that if an economic activity is performed by a public body, it should be 
analyzed whether the activity is one of those listed in Annex I of the VAT Directive. In case 
the activity lies therein, the public body will be considered as a taxable person, provided that 
such body does not carried out the activity in such a small scale as to be deemed negligible205. 
Whether the activities are performed in a negligible extent is a matter MS are able to decide, 
for they are free to adopt the parameters to determine the degree negligibility of the activities 
performed by their public bodies206. Therefore, MS may treat as non-taxable persons public 
bodies carrying out activities listed in Annex I, as long as the activities are executed in a 
negligible scale, yet, according to the ECJ, they are not required to do so207. 
 
5.3. Whether the treatment as a non-taxable person of the public body 
leads to significant distortions of competition  
 
 This criterion is presented in the second subparagraph of article 13(1) of the VAT 
Directive, which points out: 
However, when [public bodies] engage in such activities or transactions, they 
shall be regarded as taxable persons in respect of those activities or transactions 
                                                          
203 Joined Cases 231/87 and 129/88 Comune di Carpaneto Piacentino, para 13. 
204 Henkow, Oskar, Op. cit., f. n. 195, p. 41. 
205 C-446/98 Camara Municipal do Porto, para 32. 
206 Such parameters, nonetheless, should be reviewed by the national courts. See: Ibid., para 35. 
207 Ibid., para 27.  
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where their treatment as non-taxable persons would lead to significant distortions 
of competition 
 This criterion attempts to examine whether treating public bodies as a non-taxable 
person affects the decision-making process of the consumer208, as to whether such fiscal 
situation risks competition in the market. Because in case this tax treatment jeopardizes 
competition, public bodies shall be regarded as a taxable persons according to the second 
subparagraph of 13(1) of the VAT Directive.  
 Notwithstanding, for this criterion to apply, first, it should be analyzed whether the 
activity could be performed not only by public bodies but also by private persons209, or, 
however different in form, whether the activities are similar in nature as those performed by 
commercial operators210. Second, it has to be examined whether there is a risk of distorting 
competition, either actual or potential. An actual risk is present when, at the time the public 
body executed its transactions, private-sector suppliers could also bring into the market the 
same of similar transactions211. A potential risk means that at the time the public body 
performed its activities, it was possible to foresee that incoming private competitors will enter 
into the market212. Moreover, “it is sufficient that there is a glimpse of a future distortion of 
competition”213, provided that the potential risk be real and not purely hypothetical214. 
Finally, it must be determined whether the treatment of those bodies as non-taxable persons 
would lead to significant distortions of competition, in the sense that distortions should be 
more than negligible215. This is the case when such treatment would provoke a situation in 
which a significant number of private operators, carrying out similar or identical transactions 
                                                          
208 AG Opinion Case C- 246/08 Commission v Finland, para 76. 
209 AG Opinion Case C-369/04 Hutchison, para 121, AG Opinion Case C-284/04 T-Mobile, para 125, and 
Joined cases 231/87 and 129/88 Comune di Carpaneto Piacentino, para 24. 
210 Case C-369/04 Hutchison, para 37 and Case C-284/04 T-Mobile, para 43. This last parameter is in 
compliance with the requirements that the common system of VAT should be neutral, to all similar transactions, 
whatever their legal form. See Case C-77/01 EDM, para 47, and Case C‐288/07 Isle of Wight, para 44. 
211 AG Opinion Case C-369/04 Hutchison, para 139 and AG Opinion Case C-284/04 T-Mobile, para 142.  
212 AG opinion Case C-369/04 Hutchison, para 128 and AG opinion Case C-284/04 T-Mobile, para 129. 
213 AG Opinion Case C- 246/08 Commission v Finland, p 73. 
214 Case C‐288/07 Isle of Wight, paras 64-65. 
215 Case C 288/07 Isle of Wight Council, paragraph 79. The ECJ explains that the negligible criterion employed 
to ascertain whether there are significant distortions of competitions is extracted from the negligible criterion 
enshrined on the third subparagraph of article 13(1) of the VAT Directive, since both parameters are closely 
linked; they pursue the same objective; and they are subject to the same logic.  Case C- 288/07 Isle of Wight, 
paragraph 76. 
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as those performed by the public bodies, would receive a different treatment in respect of the 
levying of VAT216. 
 
5.4. Final remarks of the VAT treatment of public bodies 
 
 To recapitulate, these guidelines shape the sphere of application of the VAT 
exemption of public bodies. The first criterion aims to determine whether the activity is 
carried out as a public a public or as a private person. If determined that it is as a public 
person, then the second criterion comes into action, which targets to analyze whether the 
activity lies under the Annex I of the VAT Directive. If the activity is encompassed therein, 
then it should be examined whether it is executed in an extension greater than negligible. 
Otherwise it should be tested the third criterion, which analyzes whether the treatment of the 
public body as a non-taxable person leads to significant distortions of competitions, either 
actual or potential, provided that the risk of distortion is more than negligible.  
 The explanation of the VAT treatment of public bodies serves to better understand 
the legal context under which the ECJ solved the cases I proceed to analyze. These 
judgements are hard cases as above explained, since the solution to their legal controversy 
(whether public bodies are entitled to the exemption provided for by article 13(1) of the VAT 
Directive in respect of their activities) depended on a prior interpretation of the concept of 
economic activity, as to whether a particular transaction lies within the scope of this concept, 
whose meaning is not sufficiently clear, inasmuch as the wideness of its terms encompasses 
a great variety of transactions217.  
 Therefore, the observance of the guidelines which determine whether a particular 
activity is of an economic nature, or an explanation as to why those guidelines are not to be 
followed is required in the field of the VAT exemption of public bodies, in order to preserve 
the principle of legal certainty. This would imply, as supra referred, a second-order of 
justification in the sense of, for instance, consistency with pre-established case law and a 
combination of logos, pathos and ethos arguments. However, in the two of the following 
judgements, the ECJ either missed to apply those guidelines (Commission v Greece and 
Hutchinson & T-Mobile). I provide, nevertheless, a case (Commission v Finland) in which 
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the ECJ did apply this guidelines, as a model of how a correct observance of the                 
economic-nature criteria should be done. 
 
6. Analysis of the judgements regarding the application of the 
economic-nature criteria and the VAT treatment of public 
bodies  
 
 The cases I attempt to discuss are Commission vs Greece218, Hutchinson & T-Mobile 
219 and Commission vs Finland220. In all these judgments the concept of economic activity 
was key in solving their particular legal issues. Likewise, they deal with the VAT treatment 
of public bodies, which supra was in-depth explained. Of these cases I analyze the way the 
ECJ employed the economic-nature criteria, as to whether it respected the application of 
those guidelines, and, if so, whether it enhanced or diminished the principle of legal certainty. 
 
6.1. Commission v Greece 
 
 The first case to study is Commission vs Greece. This case dealt with the failure to 
levy VAT on motorway tolls. The Commission brought an action against the failing to subject 
to VAT tolls paid by users as consideration for the service of providing access to motorways 
and related infrastructures221. In this regard, the Commission submitted that, when providing 
access to roads on payment of a toll, National Road Construction Fund was carrying on an 
economic activity, which must have been deemed as a supply of services, via the exploitation 
of property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom222. Nonetheless, the Hellenic 
authorities took the view that tolls constituted an indirect tax and their collection was a 
transaction executed by a public authority, so that it did not fall within the scope of VAT223. 
In the first place, the ECJ deliberated that the fact that this activity was carried out by a body 
governed by public law cannot per se remove the transactions in question from the scope of 
                                                          
218 C-260/98 Commission v Greece.  
219 Cases C-369/04 Hutchison and C-284/04 T-Mobile. Although these cases were not solved jointly, they are 
based on the same reasoning. Therefore, they will be treated as a single unit. 
220 Case C- 246/08 Commission v Finland. 
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VAT224. Secondly, the ECJ analyzed whether this activity might constitute an economic 
activity. In this regard, the ECJ pointed out that the scope of the term economic activities is 
very wide, and objective in character; namely that an activity is to be considered per se and 
without regard to its purpose or results. Therefore, in the view of the wideness of its scope, 
the ECJ held that in providing access to roads in return for payment, the National Road 
Construction Fund in Greece carried out an economic activity. Also, the ECJ examined the 
existence of a direct link between the service provided and the consideration received225. 
Thereon, the ECJ took the view that providing access to roads on payment of a toll fits in that 
direct link226. This is because the payment of a toll for the use of the road depends on the 
category of vehicle used and the distance covered227. That is why providing access to roads 
on payment of a toll constitutes a supply of services for consideration228. Finally, the ECJ 
examined whether the National Road Construction Fund is entitled to the exemption of 
bodies governed by public law229. The ECJ pointed out that, for this to happen, two conditions 
must be fulfilled. First, the activities must be carried out by a body governed by public law. 
Second, they must be carried out by that body acting as a public authority230. Regarding the 
former, the ECJ affirmed that National Road Construction Fund was carrying out its activities 
a body governed by public law231, since they are part of the public administration232. With 
respect to the second, the ECJ set forth that National Road’s activities are not pursued under 
the same legal conditions as those that apply to private traders233, because they fall within the 
prerogatives of the public authority234. Therefore, the ECJ dismissed the action in its 
entirety235. 
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6.1.1. Analysis of the case Commission v Greece 
 
 I would like to start the examination of this case explaining the motives, for which 
this judgement is to be deemed as a hard case. Then, I expose the legal reasoning the ECJ 
should have followed, so that to enhance the principle of legal certainty.  
 Hard cases are those whose solution to the legal controversy depends on the 
interpretation of a norm, and whose meaning is wide or vague. In this case, the norm was the 
second subparagraph of article 9(1) of the VAT Directive regarding the concept of economic 
activity, as to whether the provision of access to motorways constituted an economic activity. 
With regard to the principle of legal certainty, as I already mentioned, this general principle 
covers two fundamental aspects. First, the foreseeable aspect which advocates for the 
predictability of legal effects, as to that those subject to, in this case the VAT Directive, must 
know the interpretation of law and, therefore, be able to plan their actions accordingly. 
Second, the rational-justificatory aspect which look for the legal reasoning of the decision-
maker to reach a state of maximum consensus within its recipients. For hard cases to achieve 
legal certainty, the court should stick to previous case-law, unless there is a reason for 
departing, and to be coherent with law. 
 Regarding this case, the ECJ deemed that the provision of access to motorways is an 
activity of an economic nature, because it lies within the scope of the terms of the concept of 
economic activity. However, the ECJ did not provide any further explanation as to the 
motives for reaching this decision; namely no reference was mentioned to the economic-
nature criteria already established in its case law, for example the activity’s degree of 
permanence or the presence of consideration. Although the ECJ has discretion to solve its 
judgments not referring to its previous judgements, as already mentioned, the ECJ should 
rationally justify its decisions consistently with pre-established case law, unless there is a 
cogent reason to departing from it. Also, it should provide a combination of logos, ethos or 
pathos arguments giving meaningful reasons in support of its decision, employing analogical 
use of precedents, and appealing to principles. However, the ECJ limited itself to ipso facto 
deem the referred provision to access as an economic activity. And so, this cannot be seen as 
a rational justification of the case.  
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 Nonetheless, the ECJ did concluded that the provision of access to motorways 
constituted a supply of services for consideration, which was determined according to the 
category of vehicle used and the distance covered, which in turn expressed the existence of 
a direct link between the toll and the use of the road. However, I would argue that, according 
to the economic-nature criteria (in specific in case Coöperatieve), the consideration of a 
supply should represent a subjective value, not a value assessed according to objective 
criteria, such as the category of the vehicle or the distance covered. It also may be pointed 
out that, in this case, the consideration was the value actually received, i.e., the toll paid by 
car drivers. Be as it may, the ECJ did not provide any sort of reasoning as to whether the 
consideration was set by subjective or objective criteria, which would have helped to clarify 
this issue.  
 The ECJ has in similar cases, nevertheless, confirmed that making road infrastructure 
available on payment of a toll constitutes an economic activity in the form of a supply of 
services in return for consideration236. In this sense, it is also possible to argue that, with 
regard to this particular sort of economic activity, the ECJ has developed a consistent line of 
argumentation shaping a “building block” in accordance with the principle of legal certainty. 
This does not leave persons in an unforeseeable situation, in which they are not able to plan 
their activities more careful for achieving a better outcome. Also, despite the disagreements 
this interpretations might arise, the ECJ reached a state of maximum consensus that road 
infrastructure, available on payment of a toll, is an economic activity in the shape of a supply 
of services. In this sense, I would argue that although the ECJ missed to rationally justify the 
economic nature of this activity, it elaborated a coherent and consistent “building block”, 
based on which people can foresee that this transaction is an economic activity, and plan their 
actions accordingly. 
 To sum up, although the ECJ did not rationally justify the economic nature of the 
provision of access to motorway roads, it did structure a coherent line of argumentation in 
which this operation is to be considered as an economic activity, thanks to which people can 
rely with certain degree of confidence that this way of reasoning will continue, unless 
circumstances change and the ECJ point it out. 
                                                          
236 See: Case C-276/97 Commission v France, para 36, Case C-408/97 Commission v Netherlands, para 30, 
Case C-83/99 Commission v Spain para 11, and Case C-359/97 Commission v UK, para 42. 
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 Finally, regarding the VAT exemption to the National Road Construction Fund, the 
ECJ did justified that its activities were carried out as a body governed by public law, as well 
as a public authority. Therefore, ECJ’s reasoning is in light of the criteria laid down under 
article 13(1) of the VAT Directive, along with the pre-established case law with confirm this 
criteria, as expressed in point 5.1 of this work. 
 
6.2. Hutchinson & T-Mobile 
 
 The second case to analyze is Hutchinson & T-Mobile. This case is about the assertion 
of several undertakings for deducting the amount of VAT, which they claimed they had paid 
when they were granted third-generation mobile telecommunications licenses. In 2000, RA 
(Radiocommunications Agency of the United Kingdom) and TCK (Telecommunications 
Control Commission of Austria) each awarded to several undertakings, by auction, licenses 
to use a defined part of the radio-frequency spectrum reserved for telecommunications 
services237. No reference to VAT was made during the auction procedure, but if RA and TCK 
were to be considered as taxable persons performing economic activities, the fee to use the 
relevant frequencies must have included VAT. That is why the companies that were assigned 
the licenses at issue claimed a right to deduct input VAT238, under article 168 of VAT 
Directive239.  
 Yet, the CCE (Commissioners of Customs and Excise of the United Kingdom) and 
the tax authorities in Austria rejected the petitions of the undertakings, for they pondered that 
actions of RA and TCK were not economic activities within the meaning of article 9(1) of 
the of the VAT Directive, but rather measures to regulate the market240. And so, they should 
not be considered as taxable persons. 
 Consequently, the domestic courts of the UK and Austria asked to the ECJ, in essence, 
whether the allocation, by auction, by public authorities, of rights for providing mobile 
telecommunications services constituted an economic activity. And, if so, whether those 
                                                          
237 Case C-369/04 Hutchison, para 22 and Case C-284/04 T-Mobile, para 25.  
238 As referred above in case T-Mobile the claimants sought for invoices showing VAT to be issued, in order to 
exercise the right to deduct VAT. See: Case C-284/04 T-Mobile, para 3. 
239 Article 168 of the VAT Directive.  
240 AG Opinion on Case C-369/04 Hutchison, para 46 and AG Opinion on Case C-284/04 T-Mobile, para 51.  
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authorities might be considered as taxable persons241, which would have the effect of 
subjecting the allocation of such licenses to VAT242. 
 To find a solution to these questions, the ECJ analyzed, first, whether those activities 
constituted exploitation of property, within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the VAT 
Directive243, in the same way as private economic operators do when supplying mobile 
telecommunications services244.  
 Then, the ECJ distinguished between granting an authorization and participating on 
the exploitation of radio-frequency spectrum. The first activity was attributed to RA and 
TCK, and the second to the undertakings. This is because the issuing of authorizations allows  
economic operators to exploit the frequency spectrum by offering their services to the public 
on the mobile telecommunications market, for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on 
a continuing basis245, but not the other way around246; namely through their activities the 
authorities ensure the effective use of the frequency spectrum, avoiding harmful interference 
between radio-based telecommunications systems and other space-based or terrestrial 
technical systems, but they do not exploit, as an economic activity, the radio spectrum247. 
 Moreover, the ECJ stated that even if such regulatory activity could be classified as 
an economic activity, it would not be encased of economic nature248. This is because, when 
issuing those licenses, authorities are not in fact participating in the telecommunications 
market; insomuch as only the economic operators exploits the radio spectrum249. Also, the 
ECJ considered irrelevant that undertakings may reallocate the licenses, for that would not 
be a similar activity which enters in competition with the first allocation done by RA and 
TCK. 
 That is why, ECJ concluded the assignment of those authorizations is not covered of 
any economic nature, for the issuance falls exclusively within the competence of RA and 
                                                          
241 Case C-369/04 Hutchison, para 25 and Case C-284/04 T-Mobile, para 31. 
242 Ibid., para 26 and Ibid., para 32. 
243 Article 9(1) of the VAT Directive. 
244 Case C-369/04 Hutchison, para 31 and Case C-284/04 T-Mobile, para 37. 
245 Ibid., para 36 and Ibid., para 42. 
246 Ibid., para 33 and Ibid., para 39. 
247 Ibid., para 34 and Ibid., para 40. 
248 Ibid., para 46 and Ibid., para 46. 
249 Ibid., para 36 and Ibid., para 42. 
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TCK250. As a result, the allocation of rights to exploit the radio spectrum can constitute 
neither an ‘economic activity’, nor the authorities taxable persons251.  
 
6.2.1. Analysis of the case Hutchinson & T-Mobile 
 
 As it was done in previous analysis of case Commission v Greece, first I examine 
whether this case is a hard case, as well as whether the ECJ’s reasoning led to the 
enhancement of the principle of legal certainty. 
 Hutchinson & T-Mobile is a hard case, because to solve the legal controversies, the 
ECJ needed to interpret the concept of economic activity (which, as it has been stated, is very 
general and wide), as to whether the allocation of rights to exploit radio spectrum was 
encased of economic nature.  
 ECJ’s justification on this matter is not in light with the parameters of legal reasoning 
which follow the principle of legal certainty. First, the ECJ was incoherent regarding the 
examination of the second subparagraph of article 9(1) of the VAT Directive, because it did 
not fully examine the different activities listed therein, which encompasses the following 
transactions: 
Any activity of producers, traders or persons supplying services, including 
mining and agricultural activities and activities of the professions, shall be 
regarded as ‘economic activity’. The exploitation of tangible or intangible 
property for the purposes of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis 
shall in particular be regarded as an economic activity 
 In the case at hand, the ECJ studied whether the allocation of radio spectrum 
constituted an exploitation of property by RA and TKC. However, I criticize this approach 
because this activity is more likely to be examined as a supply of services (as I below expose). 
Moreover, it was clear, prima facie, that RA and TKC did not participate in the market 
exploiting the radio spectrum, in the way private undertakings do. And so, it was needless to 
analyze whether such authorities exploited the radio spectrum. Rather, an examination of 
whether the referred allocation constituted either telecommunications services or a supply of 
                                                          
250 Ibid., para 35 and Ibid., para 41. 
251 Ibid., para 40 and Ibid., para 46. 
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services, according to articles 24 (2) and 25(a) of the VAT Directive252, had been more 
pertinent. These articles dispose: 
2. ‘Telecommunications services’ shall mean services relating to the 
transmission, emission or reception of signals, words, images and sounds or 
information of any nature by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic 
systems, including the related transfer or assignment of the right to use capacity 
for such transmission, emission or reception, with the inclusion of the provision 
of access to global information networks. 
[25(a)] A supply of services may consist, inter alia, in one of the following 
transactions: 
(a) the assignment of intangible property, whether or not the subject of a document 
establishing title; 
 In this sense, it is conceivable to deem the allocation of frequency rights for mobile 
telecommunications either as telecommunications services in the form of assignment of the 
right to use capacity for transmitting, emitting of receiving signals253, or as supply of services 
in the way of assigning intangible property. Moreover, considering the principle of lex 
specialis derogat legi generali, whereby more specific rules must be examined and applied 
first, if conditions governing their application are fulfilled254, a systematic interpretation of 
articles 9(1) with respect to the general concept of economic activities, together with either 
article 24(2) if decided that this is activity is to be considered as telecommunications services, 
or article 25(a) if the ECJ deemed the activity as a supply of services, would have been more 
logical, based on the wording of the provisions referred. Also, the ECJ missed to provide a 
thorough examination of whether this activity was of an economic nature as to its degree of 
                                                          
252 Although the decisions of this case was based on the Sixth VAT Directive, and so, it should have been 
examined in light of Article 6(1), the text in both article remains practically unchanged. 
253 However, others as, for instance, AG Kokott does not openly supports this view, because other language 
versions withstand an interpretation whereby the concept “capacity” should be understood in the sense of 
infrastructure, specially the German and the Dutch which refer to this concept as Einrichtungen and 
infrastructuur respectively, yet other versions such as Italian, Portuguese, French and Spanish, refer to the term 
capacity as mezzi, meios, moyens and medios, in the sense of means for transmission, which would encompass 
the issuance of licenses. Nevertheless, there is no clarity on this issue, because the ECJ did not examine this 
situation. See AG Opinion Case C-369/04 Hutchison, para 88 and AG Opinion Case C-284/04 T-Mobile, para 
93. 
254 AG Opinion Case C‐270/09 Macdonald, para 66. 
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permanence, along with whether it was carried out in return for consideration, and, finally, 
whether there was a direct link between the supply and the consideration.  
 Also, if the ECJ had examined the activities of RA and TKC as in the light of articles 
24(2) or 25(a) of the VAT Directive, together with the economic-nature criteria, its reasoning 
might have led to a thorough analysis of whether RA and TKC were exempted of VAT 
according to article 13(1) of the VAT Directive.  
 In my view, what the ECJ did was to take AG’s opinion on this case as a starting point 
to examine this judgement. This is because, in her opinion, although she concluded that the 
assignment of radio spectrum was an economic activity, AG took the view of analyzing the 
referred allocation of radio spectrum as an exploitation of property. So, it seems to me, the 
ECJ decided to debate AG’s arguments, because, as I referred, prima facie it looked not 
correct to consider that what RA and TKC did was to exploit property. That is why the ECJ 
should have analyzed whether articles 24(2) or 25(a) applied, as well as whether the activity 
was of an economic nature. 
 This reasoning creates legal uncertainty for those involved in the telecommunications 
market, because, for instance, what would happen if private undertakings would reallocate 
the radio spectrum under article 9(b) of the Directive 2009/140/EC. In this sense, would the 
ECJ take the same view and consider that such reallocation by private operators is not an 
activity of economic nature, inasmuch as those operators would not exploit property, but 
rather facilitate the exploitation of radio spectrum?255 And so, would those private 
undertakings have a right to deduct the VAT they incurred in making such supply? This 
problems arise because, as things stand now and following the ECJ’s reasoning, allocation 
of spectrum is neither exploitation of property256, nor, in consequence, an economic activity. 
As AG Mazák, in an opinion of a posterior case, pointed out: 
The activity consisting of the issuing of authorizations which allow the economic 
operators who receive them to exploit the resulting frequency use rights by 
                                                          
255 Although AG Kokott opens the window to the possibility of reassessing this VAT treatment, I still consider 
that this ruling will cause problems when this situation will arise. See: AG Opinion Case C-369/04 Hutchison, 
paras 132 and 133 and AG Opinion Case C-284/04 T-Mobile, para 139.  
256 Moreover, as I already mentioned, the ECJ does not give an alternative to examine this activity as a supply 
of services. 
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offering their services to the public on the mobile telecommunications market in 
return for remuneration does not constitute exploitation of tangible property257  
 This activity, moreover, has to be considered per se and applied whatever its legal 
form, for its character is objective. Therefore, it would be contradictory to this very position 
if the ECJ changes its criterion and sets forth that if the assignment is done by a private entity, 
then the activity is economical, but not if performed by public operators. However, had the 
ECJ analyzed whether RA and TKC carried out the assignment as public authority, then it 
would have been relevant to determine whether this activity was carried on by a public or a 
private person, but this is not the case in this situation. 
 And so, I consider that this judgment put private undertakings in a position in which 
they are not able to plan their actions, ascertaining unequivocally their rights and obligations. 
 
6.3. Commission v Finland 
 
 The third and last case to study is Commission v Finland. This case deals with the 
failure to levy VAT on legal advice services258. Thereon, the Commission sent to Finnish 
authorities a letter concerning that legal aid services provided by public legal aid offices in 
return for a part contribution had a different treatment from those provided by private 
lawyers, since the former were not subject to VAT259. According to the Commission, that 
legal aid constituted an economic activity260, and the difference in treatment might create 
significant distortions of competition to the detriment of private legal advisers261. The Finnish 
authorities, however, took the view that any distortion of competition, as a result of this, is at 
most minimal. This is because there are other aspects which influence recipients’ of legal aid 
choices, besides just VAT, such as professional experience or the workload of the public 
offices262. In those circumstances, the Commission decided to bring the present action to the 
ECJ, which concerns on the failure to levy VAT on legal aid services provided by public 
offices, in return for a part contribution borne by the recipient, where his disposable income 
                                                          
257 AG Opinion Joined Cases C‐180/10 and C‐181/10 Słaby, f.n., 10. 
258 Case C-246/08 Commission v Finland, para 1. 
259 Ibid., para 17. 
260 Ibid., para 25. 
261 Ibid., para 17. 
262 Ibid., para 18. 
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surpasses the limit set for entitlement to free legal aid, but does not surpass the maximum 
barring all entitlement to legal aid263.  
 To solve this controversy, the ECJ analyzed whether the legal aid services provided 
by the public offices in exchange for a part payment are economic activities264. To that end, 
the ECJ examined the permanency of the activity and whether it was supplied in return for 
remuneration. Regarding the former, the ECJ took the view that the public officers supplied 
legal aid on a permanent basis, despite their activity consists in the performance of duties in 
pursuance of the law265. As to the latter feature, the ECJ affirmed that a service is supplied 
in return for consideration, when the parties involved in the transaction stipulate a price266 
that arise a legal relationship between the provider of the service and the recipient267, in the 
sense of a direct link among parties pursuant to which there is reciprocal performance268. 
This is, on the one hand, the value actually given in return for the supply, and, on the other 
hand, the service provided by the supplier269. And so, the ECJ determined that, since legal 
aid services provided by the public advisers are not free of charge, the recipients of those 
services are required to pay a consideration for the legal services270. However, the 
consideration concerned is only a part of the payment, since recipients of legal advises does 
not cover the whole amount; namely the payment consists in a contribution, whose 
percentage range varies from 20% to 75% of the total amount of the fees and expenses of the 
adviser consulted271. Even though this part payment represents a portion of the fees, its 
amount is calculated considering the recipient’s income and assets, instead of the number of 
hours worked by the public offices or the complexity of the case concerned272. Therefore, the 
part payment depends just in part on the actual value of the services provided, so that the link 
                                                          
263 Ibid., paras 23 and 33. It is important to recall that, by this action, the Commission did not seek to challenge 
the fact that VAT is not levied on those services when they are provided by public offices free of charge. See: 
Ibid., para 25. 
264 Case C-246/08 Commission v Finland, para 39. 
265 Ibid., paras 40-41. 
266 Ibid., paras 43. 
267 Ibid., paras 44. 
268 Ibid., paras 44-45. 
269 Ibid., paras 44-45. 
270 Ibid., paras 46. 
271 Ibid., paras 47. 
272 Ibid., paras 48. Also, according to Finnish Government, the payments made by recipients of legal aid 
services, given by public offices amounted to EUR 1.9 million, while the gross operating costs of those offices 
were EUR 24.5 million, that is why the ECJ considered this more as a fee. See para 50. 
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between the value and the service is not sufficiently direct for that payment to be regarded as 
consideration and, as well, for those services to be regarded as economic activities273. In those 
circumstances, the ECJ concluded that there is not a prior finding that the activity considered 
is of an economic nature, and so the public officers do not engage in an economic activity274. 
 
6.3.1. Analysis of the case Commission v Finland 
 
 As I did in the analysis of previous judgments, first I justify whether this is a hard 
case, and, later on, I examine whether ECJ’s reasoning enhanced or not legal certainty. 
 Commission v Finland is a hard case because it was necessary, in order to determine 
whether the provision of legal aid by public offices is an economic activity, an interpretation 
of the concept of economic activity, together with the guidelines that shape the features of 
economic nature.  
 With regard to the principle of legal certainty, this judgement is line with the 
requirements of second-order of justification, as well as with arguments logos, ethos and 
pathos. This is because the ECJ correctly referred to the economic-nature criteria enshrined 
in pre-established case law, when analyzing whether the legal aid services, provided by the 
public offices in exchange for a part payment, constituted economic activities. In this sense, 
the ECJ first examined the degree of permanency of the activity. Second, whether the legal 
services were supplied in return for remuneration. And third, whether there was a direct link 
among parties pursuant to which there was reciprocal performance. 
 I would like, also, to highlight that even though the ECJ affirmed that the activity was 
permanent and carried out in return for remuneration, it concluded that the link was not 
sufficiently direct, inasmuch as recipients of legal aid pay only a part of the consideration, 
whose amount does not depend on subjective criteria, but rather on recipient’s income and 
assets.  This also shows a thorough examination of the scope of the economic-nature. 
 Therefore, this case exemplifies the importance of observing the economic-nature 
criteria, because it gives certainty and makes law more predictable in the way that persons 
can rely that their activities would be legally assed according to pre-established principles 
                                                          
273 Ibid., paras 51. 
274 Case C-246/08 Commission v Finland, paras 53. 
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which they know beforehand they act, so that they can be aware about their rights and 
obligations. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 The ECJ follows a de facto doctrine of stare decisis, inasmuch as it is not bound by 
its precedents, yet it seldom departs from it. 
 In order to respect the principle of legal certainty the ECJ should rationally justify its 
decisions, especially when departing from its pre-established case law. 
 The principle of legal certainty encompasses two aspects. First, the foreseeable which 
advocates for that legal effects of the application of law be predictable. And second, 
the rational-justificatory as to that courts’ legal reasoning reach a state of maximum 
consensus as to agree on that is right an offered interpretation. This allow that legal 
effects of the application of law be predictable. 
 The concept of economic activity encompasses a big number of transactions in the 
form of supply of goods or services, or exploitation of property. This is because this 
concept is very wide and is applied whatever the legal form of the activity. 
 Only activities of an economic nature lie within the scope of the VAT Directive. 
 To assess whether an activity is of an economic nature it is necessary to observe its 
degree of permanence; whether it is carried on in return for consideration; and 
whether there is a direct link between the supply of the activity and the consideration 
received, which I referred to as the economic-nature criteria. 
 In case Commission v Greece the ECJ did not rationally justify the reasons whereby 
the provisions of access to motorway roads is an activity of an economic nature. 
However, the ECJ elaborate a consistent “building block” of cases in which it 
determined that this operation is an economic activity. This wrong argumentation 
does not, therefore, diminishes the principle of legal certainty, since persons are able 
to foresee and to plan their actions in accordance with the postulates of this case. 
 ECJ’s reasoning in Hutchinson & T-Mobile, whereby the allocation of frequency is 
not an economic activity since it does not amount as exploitation of property, creates 
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n scenario of legal uncertainty for private undertakings that could reallocate the radio 
spectrum under article 9(b) of the Directive 2009/140/EC. Since, although the very 
nature of the activity points that this is either telecommunications services, or supply 
of services (therefore an economic activity), the lack of analysis of the nature of this 
activity, in the light of the economic-nature criteria does not permit to know whether 
this same activity is carried out by private operators, the ECJ would stick to this 
criterion. 
 In case Commission v Finland the ECJ adhere and analyzed in-depth the concept of 
economic activity in the light of the economic-nature criteria. That is why to consider 
the supply of legal aid services in return for a part contribution as an economic activity 
does not create any distortion to the principle of legal certainty. 
 The judgements in which the ECJ assesses the economic nature of an economic 
activity, regarding the application of the VAT treatment of public bodies enshrined 
in the VAT Directive are consistent with the principle of legal certainty, as long as it 
develop a “building block” in which persons can rely, or provide the reasons whereby 
it justifies departing from it. 
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